Worried legacy C/C++ bugs are dragging down security and speed? Here’s what you need from Google’s Nov 13, 2025 data: Android platform memory-safety issues dropped below 20% of vulnerabilities, Rust shows a 1,000× lower vulnerability density versus C/C++, new Rust changes have 4× lower rollback rates and spend 25% less time in code review, and Rust is being used in firmware, kernel-adjacent stacks and parsers. A near-miss (CVE-2025-48530) in unsafe Rust was caught pre-release and was non‐exploitable thanks to the Scudo allocator, underscoring the need for training and unsafe‐code controls. Bottom line: memory safety is shifting from a checkbox to an engineering productivity lever—start embedding Rust in new systems code, tighten unsafe‐block governance, and track platform penetration, tooling, and policy adoption.

One memory bug can cost you customers, downtime, or trigger regulation — and the U.S. government just escalated the issue: on 2025-11-16 the NSA and CISA issued guidance calling memory-safe languages (Rust, Go, Swift, Java, etc.) essential. Read this and you’ll get what happened, why it matters, key numbers, and immediate moves. Memory-safety flaws remain the “most common” root cause of major incidents; Google’s shift to Rust cut new-code memory vulnerabilities from ~76% in 2019 to ~24% by 2024. That convergence of federal guidance and enterprise pressure affects security posture, compliance, insurance, and product reliability. Immediate steps: assess exposed code (network-facing, kernel, drivers), make new modules memory-safe by default, invest in tooling (linting, fuzzing), upskill teams, and track migration metrics. Expect memory-safe languages to become a baseline in critical domains within 1–2 years (≈80% confidence).

On 2025-06-27 CISA and the NSA issued joint guidance urging adoption of memory-safe programming languages (MSLs) such as Rust, Go, Java, Swift, C#, and Python to prevent memory errors like buffer overflows and use‐after‐free bugs; researchers cite that about 70–90% of high‐severity system vulnerabilities stem from memory‐safety lapses. Google has begun integrating Rust into Android’s connectivity and firmware stacks, and national‐security and critical‐infrastructure organizations plan to move flight control, cryptography, firmware and chipset drivers to MSLs within five years. The shift matters because it reduces systemic risk to customers and critical operations and will reshape audits, procurement and engineering roadmaps. Immediate actions recommended include defaulting new projects to MSLs, hardening and auditing C/C++ modules, investing in Rust/Go skills and improved CI (sanitizers, fuzzing, static analysis); track vendor roadmaps (late 2025–2026), measurable CVE reductions by mid‐2026, and wider deployments in 2026–2027.